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THE CASE FOR CONSIDERING A CHILD’S OPINION IN DETERMINING
HABITUAL RESIDENCE IN HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION CASES
Samantha Rumsey*
I. Introduction
Imagine you are a twelve-year-old child with both U.S. and Argentine citizenship. Your
whole family lived in Argentina together until your parents divorced four years ago. Then, your
father moved to the United States, while you stayed in Argentina with your mother. Two years
ago, your mother agreed to let you live with your father for an open-ended period of time. She
thought it would be good for you to spend time with your father and to improve your English.
Now, your mother wants you to return to Argentina, but your father will not let you go. In a few
months, a U.S. court will decide whether your father is wrong for keeping you in the United
States. The outcome of these proceedings will depend heavily upon a determination of your
“country of habitual residence.” You firmly believe that Argentina is your home, and while you
have enjoyed your time in the United States, you are looking forward to returning to your school,
friends and family in Argentina. You are confused and upset when you learn that you will not be
appointed your own lawyer and that the court will not take your opinion into account when
making this important decision.1
Many children in the United States are in this frustrating and painful situation.2 In 2012,
parents in the United States opened more than 900 cases alleging international child abduction,
representing over 1,000 abducted or wrongfully-retained children. 3

In deciding a child’s

* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., magna cum laude, 2010, The College of
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1
This is a hypothetical, illustrative example.
2
See New Outgoing Cases—CY 2012, DEPARTMENT OF STATE (Nov. 24, 2013, 8:37 PM),
http://travel.state.gov/abduction/resources/resources_3860.html.
3
Id.
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“country of habitual residence,” which is often a key issue in international child abduction cases,
U.S. courts do not use a standard that directly takes a child’s opinion into account.4 Moreover, in
many circumstances, the courts that adjudicate these cases do not provide children with
independent representation.5 As a result, courts silence children in proceedings that profoundly
impact their lives.
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“Hague
Convention”), which governs international child abductions in both the United States and other
signatory countries, creates a procedure for the prompt return of internationally abducted
children.6 The stated objectives of the Hague Convention are: first, “to secure the prompt return
of children wrongfully removed or retained in any Contracting State”; and second, “to ensure
that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively
respected in other Contracting States.”7 The Hague Convention also sets out the circumstances
under which the removal or retention of a child is considered wrongful:
(1) Where the removal or retention is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a
person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of
the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the
removal or retention; and (2) At the time of removal or retention those rights were
actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for
the removal or retention.8

4

Several circuits take a child’s level of acclimatization to or past experiences in a country into account when
determining country of habitual residence; none of these circuits, however, specifically designate as a factor a
child’s testimony as to what country they feel should be that in which they are habitually resident. See, e.g.,
Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912, 918 (8th Cir. 2010); Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk, 445 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2006);
Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1401 (6th Cir. 1993).
5
See Merle H. Wiener, Intolerable Situations and Counsel for Children: Following Switzerland’s Example in Hague
Child Abduction Cases, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 355, 377 (2008).
6
See generally Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction of 1980, Oct. 25, 1980, 19 I.L.M.
1501 (1980) [hereinafter Convention]. The International Child Abduction Remedies Act implements the
Convention within the United States. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1610 (2008).
7
Convention, supra note 6, at art. 1.
8
Id. at art. 3 (emphasis added).
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Under this framework, determining a child’s state of habitual residence is absolutely
essential to analysis under the Hague Convention because the child’s country of habitual
residence supplies the domestic law that determines whether a child’s removal violated a
parent’s rights.9 Yet, despite the importance of country of habitual residence determinations, the
text of the Convention does not define this term.10 The Convention drafters deliberately chose
not to define the term in order to “leave the notion free from technical rules which can produce
rigidity and inconsistencies.”11
Early decisions outside the United States sought to obey the drafters’ wishes and avoid
overcomplicating the issue of habitual residence with layers of inflexible doctrine.12 An English
opinion widely cited in American courts expressed this aspiration:
It is greatly to be hoped that the courts will resist the temptation to develop
detailed and restrictive rules as to habitual residence, which might make it as
technical a term of art as common law domicile. The facts and circumstances of
each case should continue to be assessed without resort to presumptions or presuppositions.13
In U.S. courts, however, this hope quickly evaporated. For more than twenty years, U.S.
circuit courts of appeals have disagreed over how “habitual residence” should be defined.
Specifically, courts have differed as to whether more weight should be given to the child’s
experience and level of acclimatization or to the parents’ “settled purpose” to live with a child in
a given place.14 Even those courts that more heavily emphasize the child’s experience in their

9

Id.
Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 1995).
11
Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing J.H.C. MORRIS, DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 144 (10th ed. 1980)).
12
Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729, 742 (7th Cir. 2013) (discussing the Convention’s failure to define the term
habitual residence and discussing foreign courts’ early decisions interpreting the term).
13
Id. (citing Re Bates (1989), No. CA 122/89 (High Ct. of Justice, Fam. Div., Eng), 1989 WL 1683783.
14
Compare, e.g., Feder, 63 F.3d at 224 (“[A] child’s habitual residence is the place where he or she has been
physically present for an amount of time sufficient for acclimatization and which has a ‘degree of settled purpose’
from the child’s perspective.”), and Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1401 (“To determine the habitual residence, the court
must focus on the child, not the parents, and examine past experience, not future intentions.”), with Mozes, 239 F.3d
10

3

analysis do not directly take the child’s opinion into account as a factor for deciding country of
habitual residence.15
This Comment argues that U.S. courts should consider a child’s opinion when deciding
his or her country of habitual residence in Hague Convention cases. 16 This Comment further
contends that courts should appoint counsel for children in all Hague Convention cases because
mandatory representation is the best way to give children a strong voice in habitual residence
determinations. Simply put, considering children’s views and giving them dedicated attorneys to
advocate for these beliefs would result in more accurate and child-friendly determinations of
country of habitual residence. Finally, this Comment presents a model standard for determining
country of habitual residence and looks to other countries’ approaches to providing children with
representation.
Part II of this Comment outlines the two main approaches to determining country of
habitual residence that have been adopted by U.S. courts. Part III sets out the alternate tests used
in both common law and civil law foreign jurisdictions. Part IV discusses the U.S. trend against
appointing counsel to represent children in Hague Convention cases. Part V presents arguments
in support of the creation of a child-centric system for determining country of habitual residence
and offers U.S. courts a model standard for determining country of habitual residence. Part VI
at 1076 (“[T]he intention or purpose which has to be taken into account is that of the person or persons entitled to fix
the place of the child’s residence.”).
15
See Eran Sthoeger, International Child Abduction and Children’s Rights: Two Means to the Same End, 32 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 511, 529 (2011) (“As for the methods of obtaining the child's views, courts tend to do so through a
welfare officer or psychologist working on behalf of the court, or through the parents.”).
16
It is important to note that children have the best chance of voicing their opinion in Hague Convention cases by
utilizing the “child’s objection” exception to the Convention’s mandatory return requirement. This gives a judicial
authority the option to “refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and
has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.” See Convention
supra note 6, at art. 13. This exception, however, was intended by the Convention drafters to be used sparingly. See
Christina Piemonte, Comment, International Child Abduction and Courts’ Evolving Considerations in Evaluating
the Hague Convention’s Defenses to Return, 22 TUL. J. INT’L COMP. L. 191, 194 (2013) (citing Convention, supra
note 6, at arts. 1, 2, 12, 13, 20). The intention that this exception be used in a limited fashion supports this
Comment’s proposition that a child’s opinion should be taken into account specifically with respect to country of
habitual residence determinations. See discussion infra Section V.C.

4

describes how other Hague Convention signatory countries have implemented the requirement of
appointed counsel and argues that the appointment of independent counsel for the child in every
U.S. Hague Convention case would lead to more child-friendly determinations of country of
habitual residence. Part VII concludes this Comment.
II. U.S. Courts’ Tests For Determining Country Of Habitual Residence
U.S. circuit courts fall roughly into two camps with respect to their approaches to
deciding a child’s country of habitual residence.

The first group emphasizes the child’s

perspective and gives secondary consideration to parents’ intentions. The second set focuses on
parental intent and only gives consideration to the child’s perspective in extraordinary cases.
A. Emphasis on the Child’s Perspective
The Third, Sixth and Eighth Circuits have each held that a determination of country of
habitual residence should focus on the child’s perspective, though they have differed in how
much weight they give to parents’ intentions as an additional factor for consideration. All three
circuits fail to directly consider a child of reasonable age and maturity’s opinion as to what is his
or her country of habitual of residence.
The Sixth Circuit in Friedrich v. Friedrich was the first federal appellate court to
approach the question of which country is a child’s habitual residence by focusing on the
perspective of the child.17 In this case, a German man and an American woman stationed for
military service in Germany married and had a child.18 After about a year and a half, a marital
dispute resulted in the mother taking the child to the United States without the father’s consent or
knowledge.19 The German father filed a petition in the United States alleging that his son’s

17

Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1396.
Id. at 1398.
19
Id. at 1399.
18
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removal from Germany was wrongful.20 The court first emphasized that a habitual residence
inquiry must “focus on the child, not the parents, and examine past experience, not future
intentions.”21 The court also explicitly noted that changes in parental affection and responsibility
could not alter habitual residence.22 In this case, the court did not attempt to elicit the child’s
opinion about whether Germany or the United States was his country of habitual residence; the
court likely did not consider the child’s views, however, because he was very young at the time
of the wrongful retention.23
In Feder v. Evans-Feder, the Third Circuit joined the Sixth Circuit and held that country
of habitual residence determinations should focus on the child’s perspective. 24 The court,
however, qualified this holding by stating that while the standard must “focus on the child,” it
must also consider “the parents’ present, shared intentions regarding their child’s presence
there.”25 As in Friedrich, the possibility of taking an affected child’s opinion into account was
not considered; this failure, however, potentially related to the fact that the child at issue was
only four years old at the time of unlawful removal.26
In Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk, another Hague Convention case, the Third Circuit
confronted a very different set of facts. 27 Maria Kovalchuk was born in Russia to married
parents, who divorced when she was five years old.28 After their divorce, Maria’s father moved

20

Id.
Id. at 1401.
22
Id. at 1402 (“[H]abitual residence can be “altered” only by a change in geography and the passage of time, not by
changes in parental affection and responsibility.”).
23
Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1398.
24
Feder, 63 F.3d at 224 (“A child’s habitual residence is the place where he or she has been physically present for
an amount of time sufficient for acclimatization and which has a “degree of settled purpose” from the child’s
perspective.”).
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 285–87.
28
Id. at 285.
21
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to the United States and her mother moved to Finland.29 Maria’s parents agreed that she would
live with her mother in Finland, and Maria lived there until she was eleven years old. 30 At
eleven, after acquiring U.S. Permanent Resident Status, Maria expressed a desire to move to the
United States permanently.31 She said goodbye to her teacher and friends, and as soon as the
Finnish school year ended, she went to the United States to live with her father with her mother’s
permission.32 At the end of the summer, Maria desired to stay in the United States, and over her
mother’s objections, Maria’s father did not send her back to Finland.33 Subsequently, litigation
ensued.34 In determining Maria’s country of habitual residence, the Third Circuit clarified its
holding in Feder and held that that in making a country of habitual residence determination a
trier of fact should focus on: (1) “acclimatization and settled purpose ‘from the child’s
perspective’”; and (2) parental intent, both with respect to how it affects a child’s perspective
and by giving “independent weight to ‘the parents’ present shared intentions regarding their
child’s presence’ in a particular place.”35
The Karkkainen court was also unique in that it explicitly stated that shared parental
intent should be given great weight in cases of very young children and less weight in cases of
older children. 36 The court, did not decide exactly how much weight shared parental intent
should be given in cases of older children, such as Maria.37 Additionally, even though the court

29

Id.
Id.
31
Id. at 286.
32
Id. The facts of the case indicate that Maria’s mother gave her explicit permission to live in the United States for
the summer. In a later conversation, Maria’s stepfather told her that she was free to make the decision to remain in
the United States at the end of the summer. Because her mother did not disagree with this statement, “Maria was
left with the impression that she had been given permission to move permanently to the United States if she
wished.” Id.
33
Karkkainen 445 F.3d at 286.
34
Id. at 286.
35
Id. at 292 (citing Feder, 63 F.3d at 224).
36
Id. at 296.
37
Id.
30
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repeatedly stated that Maria was mature and intelligent, 38 the court did not directly consider
Maria’s opinion about her country of habitual residence.39
In Barzilay v. Barzilay, a case in which an Israeli citizen alleged his former wife
wrongfully retained his children in the United States, the Eighth Circuit adopted the rationale of
Feder.40 The court held that, “the ‘settled purpose’ of a family’s move to a new country is the
central element of the habitual residence inquiry” and that this purpose “must be from the child’s
perspective.” 41 The court further emphasized that the determination should be “particularly
sensitive to the perspective and circumstances of the child.”42 Despite the court’s decision to
focus on the child’s perspective, it did not consider the opinion of the eldest child affected by the
proceedings, who was twelve years old at the time the alleged wrongful retention occurred.43
B. Emphasis on the Parents’ Perspectives
In contrast, other circuit courts choose to emphasize the parents’ perspectives. The
seminal case finding that parental intent should determine a child’s habitual residence is the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Mozes v. Mozes. 44 Many courts have modeled their approach to
determining habitual residence after this decision.45 In Mozes, the court held that in order to
determine whether a child acquires a new habitual residence, judges should give the most weight
38

Id. at 286 (“Maria is both mature and intelligent for her age”); id. at 294 (“Maria is ‘uniquely talented and highly
intelligent,’ an experienced traveler with strong English skill, and mature for her age.”).
39
In a subsequent case related to the wrongful retention of a five-year-old child, Tsai-Yi Yang v. Fu-Chiang Tsui,
although the court did not consider the child’s opinion they did seem to indicate that this would be appropriate in the
cases of older children stating, “[a]s the record does not reflect Raeann’s perspective on her habitual residence, we
must focus on the parents’ present, shared intentions.” 416 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2005).
40
Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912, 918 (8th Cir. 2010).
41
Id.
42
Id. at 920.
43
Id.
44
Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001).
45
See D. MARIANNE BLAIRE ET AL, FAMILY LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 440 (2d ed. 2009) (citing Tsai-Yi Yang
v. Fu-Chiang Tsui, 416 F.3d 199, 272 (3d Cir. 2005); Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703 (7th Cir. 2006); Gitter v. Gitter,
396 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2005); Ruiz v. Tenorio, 392 F.3d 127 (11th Cir. 2004); Silverman v. Silverman, 338, F.3d 886
(8th Cir. 2003); see also Papakosmas v. Papakosmas, 483 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2007) (adopting Mozes’ country of
habitual residence rule); Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2004) (also adopting Mozes’ country of habitual
residence rule).
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to the intentions or purposes of the “person or persons who are entitled to fix the place of the
child’s residence.” 46 The court qualified this rule by stating that the settled intention of the
parents must be accompanied by “an actual change in geography” and the passage of a sufficient
length of time for the child to have become acclimatized.47
The court also addressed when, if ever, evidence of acclimatization of a child can suffice
to establish a child’s habitual residence despite uncertain or conflicting parental intent. 48 In
answering this question, the court held that a child could lose his or her habitual attachment to a
place without a parent’s consent only in circumstances where “the objective facts point
unequivocally to a person’s ordinary or habitual residence being a particular place.”49 The court
further elaborated that this means that a child must show that his or her “relative attachments
have changed to the point where requiring return to the original forum would now be tantamount
to taking the child ‘out of the family and social environment in which its life has developed.’”50
This holding set a high bar for individuals trying to show that a child’s acclimatization can
overcome parental intent. 51
The Eleventh Circuit adopted a similar definition of “country of habitual residence” in
Ruiz v. Tenorio.52 In this case, an American couple and their two children moved to Mexico
after seven years living as a family in the United States.53 While in Mexico, the father took a
job, the family began construction on an “American-style” home, and the children attended
46

Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1077.
Id. at 1078.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 1081.
50
Id.
51
See Tai Vivatvaraphol, Back to Basics: Determining A Child’s Habitual Residence In International Child
Abduction Cases Under the Hague Convention 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3325, 3349 (2009); see also Gitter, 396 F.3d
124, 134 (adopting the Mozes approach and emphasizing that it is only in “relatively rare circumstances” that “a
child’s acclimatization to a location abroad will be so complete that serious harm can be expected to result from
compelling his return to his family’s intended residence”).
52
Ruiz v. Tenorio, 392 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2004).
53
Id. at 1249.
47
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school and forged friendships.54 After about two years in Mexico, the couple separated; and, a
few months later, the mother removed the children to the United States.55 Applying the Mozes
definition,56 the court held that although the case was “close,” the parents had never formed a
settled intent to abandon the children’s habitual residence in the United States.57 Moreover, it
held that the children had not sufficiently acclimated to Mexico to overcome their parents’ lack
of shared intent.58
In Koch v. Koch the Seventh Circuit also adopted the rule in Mozes, but added a new
emphasis, arguing that the rule was not rigid and that courts applying it should be “keenly aware
of the flexible, fact-specific nature of the habitual residence inquiry envisioned by the
Convention.”59 In this case, Mr. and Mrs. Koch and their two children moved from the United
States to Germany when one of the children was only eleven days old and the other was a
toddler.60 Both parties agreed that the move was a semi-temporary way both for the family to
save money and for Mr. Koch to accrue work experience.61 After two years in Germany, Mr.
Koch took the children to the United States without their mother’s knowledge or consent. 62
Several months later, Mr. Koch returned to Germany; but after about five months, he removed
the children to the United States for the second time.63 At the time of the second removal one
child had lived her whole life64 in Germany, and the other had lived three of his five years in

54

Id. at 1249–51.
Id. at 1250.
56
Id. at 1252.
57
Id. at 1256.
58
Ruiz, 392 F.3d at 1255.
59
Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703, 716 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009, 1015 (9th Cir. 2004))
(emphasis added).
60
Id. at 706.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 707.
63
Id. at 708.
64
Here, “whole life” excludes the period of wrongful removal.
55
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Germany. 65 Based on a flexible inquiry, the court held that the parents had abandoned the
children’s habitual residence in the United States.66 Moreover, it held that even if the parents
had not chosen to abandon the United States, the children had become acclimated to Germany to
an extent that it had become their habitual residence.67 This case serves as an example of the
most weight that can be given to a child’s perspective in a court that follows the Mozes rule.
C. The Impact of Immigration Status on “Degree of Settled Purpose”
Although courts generally follow one of the above previous approaches when
determining a child’s habitual residence, an additional factor that can have an impact on
determinations of habitual residence is immigration status. While an unlawful or precarious
immigration status does not preclude one from becoming a habitual resident under the Hague
Convention, it prevents one from doing so rapidly. 68 Specifically, a lack of lawful immigration
status presents a problem for a parent advocating that the United States is his or her child’s
country of habitual residence when the court is focused on the parents’ perspective or “settled
purpose” as the most important factor in determining country of habitual residence. 69
For example, in Alonzo v. Claudino, two undocumented Honduran citizens disputed their
eight-year-old daughter’s habitual residence in a Hague Convention case.70 Mother, father, and
daughter resided in the United States, but no one in the family had lawful immigration status.71
The mother argued that her daughter’s habitual residence was the United States because the
daughter had lived there for two years and because both the mother and father made the decision

65

Koch, 450 F.3d at 709.
Id. at 717.
67
Id. at 717–718.
68
Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1082 n.45 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing E.M. Clive, The Concept of Habitual
Residence, 1997 JURID. REV. 137, 147 (1997)).
69
Id. (“[Immigration status is also a highly relevant circumstance when, as here, the shared intent of the parents is in
dispute.”).
70
Alonzo v. Claudino, No. 1:06CV00800, 2007 WL 475340 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 7, 2007).
71
Id. at *1.
66
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to come to the United States.72 Ultimately, the court—following a parent-centric approach—
held that the “degree of settled purpose” necessary to establish habitual residency in the United
States for the purpose of the Convention does not exist when the child and parent advocating for
the United States as the habitual residence country are not lawfully present in the United States73
Alonzo and other cases holding that a lack of lawful immigration status is an obstacle to
acquiring habitual residence in a country are particularly problematic, because they entirely
disregard the perspective of the child. 74

Consider, for example, the common case of a

Guatemalan child who has lived since age two with her undocumented immigrant parents in the
United States and considers herself American in every way but on paper. If a court follows the
Alonzo rule strictly, the determination of this child’s habitual residence will have no nexus with
reality; the court will be forced to hold that she habitually resides in Guatemala, despite her
complete lack of connection with the country. Instead of the current approach, U.S. courts
should give much less weight to a parent and child’s immigration status and instead focus on
where the individual child believes his or her home to be.
III. International Approaches to Determining Country of Habitual Residence
U.S. courts rarely cite international case law75 when deciding which standard to use in
country of habitual residence determinations. 76

72

Nonetheless, because one of the Hague

Id. at *5.
Id. at *6 (“It is impossible to be settled when you are subject to arrest and deportation at any time[.] . . .
[Moreover,] Ms. Pineda has taken no steps to acquire legal status in the United States.”).
74
Id.; see also Carrasco v. Carrillo-Castro, 862 F.Supp.2d 1262, 1274 (D.N.M. 2012) (holding that father’s lack of
immigration status in the United States weighed against finding the United States to be his child’s country of
habitual residence); Miltiadous v. Tetervak, 686 F.Supp. 2d 544, 551 n.9 (E.D.Pa. 2010) (holding that a mother’s
uncertain immigration status in the United States weighed against a finding that the United States was her children’s
country of habitual residence).
75
Justice Scalia is arguably the Supreme Court Justice who most frequently criticizes U.S. courts’ use of
international law. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“But the Prize for the
Court's Most Feeble Effort to fabricate ‘national consensus’ must go to [the majority’s] appeal . . . to the views of . .
. members of the so-called ‘world community’ . . . . Equally irrelevant are the practices of the ‘world community,’
whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people.”); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,
868 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that an international organization’s account of what it considers to be
73
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Convention’s goals is uniform interpretation and application of its text, and because the Supreme
Court and the Vienna Convention advocate consideration of the “decisions of the United States’
sister signatories” in order to achieve this goal, this Comment looks at foreign decisions.77
A. Common Law Approaches
Common law countries, as a general rule, tend to align with Mozes and its progeny.78 For
example, one of the most frequently cited common law cases is Re Bates, an English decision
which articulated and adopted the principle of “settled purpose.”79 In that case, the court stated
that all that is required for a residence to be habitual is that the parent’s purpose of living where
he or she does must have, “a sufficient degree of continuity to enable it properly to be described
as settled.”80 Specifically, the court said that a parent may possess this settled purpose even if he
or she only intends to live in the country in question for a limited period. 81 Based on this rule,
the court held that where an apartment was originally intended by both parents to be a temporary
base, it acquired a more settled purpose because of the parents’ actions, including making
arrangements for the child’s care, accommodations, and speech therapy.82 Therefore, the court
found the country in which this apartment was located to be the habitual residence.83 The flaw in
using this case as an absolute model, however, is that it did not address whether the “overtly
stated intentions” of an older child should be taken into account when determining habitual
residence.
“civilized standards of decency in other countries . . . is totally inappropriate as a means of establishing the
fundamental beliefs of this nation.”).
76
Tai Vivatvaraphol, supra note 51, at 3354.
77
Id. See also Abott v. Abbott 560 U.S. 1, 16 (2010) (citing 42 U.S.C. (b)(3)(B) §11601 (2008)) (holding that
considering the views of sister signatories is important in interpreting treaties generally and emphasizing that this
“principle applies with special force in [Hague Convention cases]” because “Congress has directed that ‘uniform
international interpretation of the Convention’ is part of the Convention’s framework.”).
78
Id.
79
Re Bates, (1989) CA 122/89 (High Ct. of Justice, Fam. Div., Royal Cts. of Justice) 1989 WL 1683783.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
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A second key common law case, Cooper v. Casey, adopted an approach similar to that of
Bates. 84 The court elaborated further on the Bates rule for determining country of habitual
residence and set forth two principles: first, a young child’s habitual residence is the same as that
of his or her parents and neither parent can unilaterally change it without the other parent’s
consent.85 Second, the habitual residence of a married couple is the country that the couple has
voluntarily adopted for settled purposes as part of their regular lives. 86 Again, this case is
problematic because it did not address how the approach would vary if it were applied to
determining the habitual residence of an older or mature child.
B. Civil Law Approaches
Civil law countries have frequently adopted more objective approaches to determining
habitual residence under the Hague Convention.87 Compared to common law countries, these
nations’ approaches line up more squarely with Friedrich and its progeny.88 For example, in
Wilner, Eduardo Mario v. Osswald, María Gabriela, Argentina’s Supreme Court of Justice faced
a case in which a mother removed her three-year-old child, who had lived her entire life in
Canada, from the country and brought her to Argentina.89 The court adopted a child-centric
approach90 to determining country of habitual residence and emphasized that any interpretation
that makes a child’s habitual residence dependent on the parents’ domicile is mistaken.91 The
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court then held that since the child had developed her life in Canada, the locale of her family and
school, her habitual residence was Canada.92
A Swedish court faced with a similar case also put the emphasis in determining country
of habitual residence on the child’s perspective.93 In Johnson v. Johnson, the court held that
“habitual residence is where there is constancy with regard to the duration of the period
concerned, among other factors.”94 The court then added that such an inquiry should take into
account all relevant objective circumstances that can show a child’s permanent attachment to one
country over another, including the child’s existing social ties.95
In sum, the approaches of both U.S. and international courts leave much to be desired in
terms of their methods for determining country of habitual residence—specifically, the explicit
opinion of the child. While the Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits come the closest to considering
children’s opinions by focusing on the child’s perspective, even these fail to take the children’s
opinions directly into account when determining country of habitual residence. The next section
discusses the U.S. trend against appointing lawyers for children in Hague Convention
proceedings, which further limits American children’s ability to influence country of habitual
residence determinations. The remainder of the Comment presents arguments in support of (1)
including the child’s opinion as a heavily-weighted factor in country of habitual residence
determinations and (2) requiring all U.S. courts to appoint attorneys to represent children in
Hague Convention cases.
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IV. U.S. Trend Against Appointing Counsel For Children In Hague Convention Cases
Although U.S. courts have the authority to appoint guardians ad litem, counsel, or both
for children in Hague Convention cases, 96 in practice, separate representation is “far less
common than warranted.”97 There are several reasons for the rarity of appointed counsel in these
types of cases. First, in many traditional custody cases, third parties, such as mediators, social
workers, or grandparents have a stake in the legal proceedings, and these individuals are able to
either advocate for the child’s rights or ask the court to appoint an attorney for the child.98 In
Hague Convention cases, however, it is less common for such interested persons to be involved
in proceedings,99 and therefore, it is less common for someone to speak up and request that the
judge appoint counsel for the child.100 Additionally, since a relatively small number of Hague
Convention cases are brought each year101 and many judges are unfamiliar with the intricacies of
these cases,102 some judges may assume Hague Convention cases deal with purely jurisdictional
issues.103 Consequently, fact finders may believe that a dedicated representative for the child is
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Weiner, supra note 5, at 377 n.214. Some courts adjudicating Hague petitions appoint a guardian ad litem:
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4548570 (D. Colo. Dec. 19, 2007); McManus v. McManus, 354 F. Supp. 2d 62, 69 (D. Mass. 2005); Olguin v.
Santana, No. 03 CV 6299(JG), 2004 WL 1752444 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2004). Some courts appoint an attorney who
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Id. at 377.
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not necessary. The average young age of many children involved in Hague Convention cases 104
may also lead judges to believe that the appointment of counsel would not be helpful in such
cases. Finally, in some cases, judges reject requests for the appointment of counsel for a child.105
V. Why U.S. Courts Should Create A Child-Centric System For Determining Country Of
Habitual Residence
As shown above, even the most child-centric courts in the United States and abroad often
fail to consider a child’s personal perspective or opinion about his or her country of habitual
residence in making habitual residence determinations under the Hague Convention. 106 This is
far from the trend in other areas of law that affect children; many domestic and international laws
require the consideration of a child’s opinion in proceedings that affect his or her life. Moreover,
common-sense arguments support the need to include children’s opinions in making these
determinations.

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, children’s opinions are already

considered in Hague Convention cases in the limited context of the Convention’s objection-toreturn exception.107 Below, this Comment discusses these areas of the law and explains why
courts should follow the trends they create in order to revolutionize the process for determining
habitual residence under the Hague Convention.

the result is not the transfer of the case to the home country’s court, but a requirement that the country of removal
secure the prompt return of the child.
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another country by the other parent” found that the average age of abducted children was five years.) See also Swiss
Federal Office of Justice, International Child Abduction and Contact Conflicts at 20, available at
http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/content/dam/data/gesellschaft/kindesentfuehrung/bro-kindsentfuehrung-e.pdf (“The
average age of the children involved [in Swiss international child abduction cases] is approximately seven years.”).
105
See, e.g., Clarke v. Clarke, No. 08-690, 2008 WL 2217608, at *4 n.3 (E.D. Pa. May 27, 2008) (finding no
authority in state law for an appointment in a Hague case); Hasan v. Hasan, No. 03-11960-GAO, 2004 WL 57073, at
*4 (D. Mass. Jan. 13, 2004) (claiming an appointment would lead the court to litigate the children's best interests,
something prohibited by the Convention).
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See, e.g., Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk, 445 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2006); Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 224 (3d
Cir. 1995); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396 (6th Cir. 1993).
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Convention, supra note 6, at art. 13
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A. International Laws Guaranteeing a Child’s Right to be Heard
Although the section of the Hague Convention dealing with country of habitual residence
determinations does not give national courts adjudicating cases much guidance as to whether or
not a child’s views should be considered, other sections of the Hague Convention explicitly
require consideration of the child’s opinion.108 One such area is Article Thirteen, which sets out
the situations in which a state is not required to carry out the return of a child to his country of
habitual residence.109
Article Thirteen creates one particularly relevant exception which states that a court “may
refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has
attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take into account its
views.”110 The biggest interpretative challenge with this exception is related to determining at
what age a child acquires sufficient maturity to take advantage of it. 111 The Hague Convention
itself contains no “threshold age” for hearing a child’s objections, but some U.S. courts have
created such a threshold.112 For example, one court held that the children’s objection clause
“simply does not apply to a nine-year-old,”113 seemingly establishing that as a matter of law a
nine-year-old may not raise an objection under Article Thirteen, Section Two.114 Another U.S.
court held that courts are not precluded as a matter of law from considering the views of an
eight-year-old under Article Thirteen.115
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In contrast, some U.S. courts focus more on the individual child’s maturity when
determining whether a child is old enough to take advantage of the “objection to return”
exception. In In re Interest of Zarate, an Illinois court focused on the eight-year-old objecting
child’s individual comprehension level and discounted her objection because during an
interview, she could not identify the year she was born, list all of her school classes, or
distinguish between her natural father and her stepfather.” 116 Other U.S. courts rely on the
decisions of counselors and psychologists to determine whether the child is sufficiently mature to
have his views considered. 117 As a general rule, U.S. courts generally favor a “narrow”
construction of what constitutes age and maturity and are reluctant to consider children’s
objections.118
English and South African courts have taken a different approach. For example, in Re S,
the English Court of Appeals held:
When Art. 13 speaks of an age and maturity level at which it is appropriate to take
account of a child’s views, the enquiry which it envisages is not restricted to a
generalized appraisal of the child’s capacity to form unexpressed views which
bear the hallmark of maturity. It is permissible (and indeed will often be
necessary) for the court to make specific enquiry as to whether the child has
reached a stage of development at which, when asked the question, ‘Do you
object to a return to your home country?’ he or she can be relied on to give an
answer which does not depend upon instinct alone, but is influenced by the
discernment which a mature child brings to the questions, [for example,
considering the] implications for his or her own best interests in the long and short
term.”119
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This more relaxed standard allows English courts the flexibility to accept the objections of young
children in cases where such consideration is warranted. 120 South Africa also considers the
objections of young children, 121 both by using both a flexible standard and by requiring
dedicated representation for all children in Hague Convention proceedings.122 This combination
has allowed South African courts to consider the objections of children as young as five and
eight years old.123
The English and South African approaches provide the best option for determining
whether a child’s opinion should be taken into account, because they allow all children who are
able to form a reasoned opinion about their best interests to have a voice in the proceedings that
profoundly affect their lives. This broad approach to determining whether a child is mature
enough to be heard should be applied to considering a child’s opinion on his or her country of
habitual residence.
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (“U.N. Convention”), ratified
by every nation in the world except the United States, Somalia, and South Sudan,124 is another
international instrument that codifies children’s right to be heard.125 The treaty expresses the
principle that children are entitled to freedom of expression and assures that children have a
voice in legal proceedings and custody decisions that directly affect their interests. 126 The
United States’ failure to ratify the U.N. Convention means that the treaty is not binding law in
120
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the United States, but the U.S. Secretary of State did sign the original treaty.127 This signature,
along with the U.N. Convention’s widespread acceptance and support, make the principles it
articulates persuasive in American courts.128
The most relevant provision of the U.N. Convention is Article Twelve.129 This Section
provides that, “a child who is capable of forming his or her views has the right to express those
views freely in all matters affecting the child.”130 This provision should be considered by U.S.
courts in their formulation of standards for determining country of habitual residence in Hague
Convention cases. If U.S. courts were to take this provision into account, they would be forced
to acknowledge that the current dominant interpretations of habitual residence—which consider
only evidence of a child’s acclimatization and settled parental intent—are in direct violation of
Article Twelve. In order to comply with this important piece of international law, U.S. courts
should create opportunities for children to speak their minds and have their thoughts considered
in Hague Convention cases.
B. U.S. Laws Guaranteeing a Child’s Right to be Heard
Traditionally, under U.S. law, children had very little voice in the resolution of disputes
regarding their own residence, care, and access to each parent. 131 Today, however, U.S. courts
are more open to considering children’s wishes in traditional custody disputes. 132 A child’s
wishes are often considered as a part of a “best interests of the child”-style determination.

127

LUISA BLANCHFIELD, CONG. RES. CTR., THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD:
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ISSUES 1 (Cong. Res. Ctr., ed., 2009) (“On February 16, 1995, then-Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright signed the Convention on behalf of the United States.”).
128
Rebeca Rios-Kohn, The Convention on the Rights of the Child, Progress and Challenge, 5 GEO J. ON FIGHTING
POVERTY 156–57 (1998).
129
U.N. Convention, supra note 125, at art. 12.
130
Id.
131
D. MARIANNE BLAIR ET AL, FAMILY LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 422 (2009).
132
Id.

21

Section 402 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (“UMDA”) attempts to codify
existing law dealing with child custody in disparate U.S. jurisdictions. 133 For this reason, it
serves as a good representation of how U.S. state courts consider a child’s opinion in child
custody determinations. UMDA Section 402 states: “The court shall determine custody in
accordance with the best interests of the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors
including: . . . (2) The wishes of the child as to his custodian[.] . . .”134 The fact that a child’s
wishes are such a prominent factor in determining custody in domestic disputes serves as a
strong argument for why courts should consider this same opinion in Hague Convention cases.
Additionally, individual U.S. courts assign a great deal of weight to children’s wishes in
making custody determinations. This trend is illustrated by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
case, Johns v. Cioci.135 In Johns, the court held that when an adjudicator is trying to determine
which of two equally suitable households a child should live in, the preference of the child can
“tip the scales in favor of one or the other.” 136 Moreover, the court stated, “even if [two]
households are not equivalently suitable for rearing [a child], the child’s preference is a factor
that must be carefully considered in custody decisions, keeping in mind the child's maturity and
intelligence, as well as the reasons that the child offers for the preference.”137
C. Common Sense Arguments in Favor of Including a Child’s Opinion in Country of
Habitual Residence Determinations
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of weighing children’s opinions as the most
important factor in country of habitual residence determinations in Hague Convention cases is
simple common sense. If judges give children the opportunity to set forth their opinions about
133
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what country they consider to be home, the process may reveal relevant information that
otherwise never would have been exposed.138 Moreover, hearing a child’s explanation of why he
or she considers one country to be “home” can often provide a stronger picture of the child’s
“level of acclimatization” than other objective factors.139 Finally, allowing a child to express
him or herself is the easiest way for a judge to determine whether the child’s interests conflict
with those of his or her parents.
Those critical of weighing children’s opinions heavily in country of habitual residence
determinations may argue that children can be unduly influenced by the parent they live with or
that children who are victims abuse may be coerced by their abusive parent into lying in court.
This is a valid concern. These problems can be remedied, however, by requiring courts to
appoint a dedicated attorney for the child in all Hague Convention cases.140 This, and further
arguments in support of requiring court appointed counsel to represent children in all Hague
Convention cases are handled more thoroughly in Part VI below.
D. Proposed Standard for Determining Country of Habitual Residence
With the above arguments in mind, important changes should be made to the way U.S.
courts deal with Hague Convention cases. Specifically, courts should adopt a uniform standard
for determining country of habitual residence. In figure one, below, this Comment proposes a
starting point for such a standard:
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Figure 1. Model Standard
a. When determining country of habitual residence for the purpose of the Hague
Convention On The Civil Aspects Of International Child Abduction, courts
should balance three key factors: (1) the child’s level of adjustment and
acclimatization to each place that is claimed to be his country of habitual
residence; (2) the settled intent of the individuals with the right to fix the
child’s residence; and (3) the child’s perspective and personal opinion as to
which country is his home.
b. Factor (3) should only be considered if the child is old enough to articulate
such an opinion. This factor should be given additional weight if the child is
of a “significant age and maturity level”.141
c. Factor (3) should be discounted if one parent or a third party has unduly
influenced the child. The parent alleging undue influence bears the burden of
proving this allegation.
This standard is ideal for two reasons. First, it will require courts to put more emphasis on
children’s opinions about where they consider home, bringing the United States into compliance
with respected international law such as the U.N. Convention. This consequence will result in
more accurate country of habitual residence determinations. Second, a uniform standard will
provide parents with improved capacity to predict whether a planned removal or retention of
their child is wrongful and therefore result in increased compliance with the Hague
Convention.142
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VI. Courts Should Appoint Counsel to Represent Children in Hague Convention Cases
In contrast with the United States, other Hague Convention signatory countries require
appointed counsel in international child abduction cases. The United States should follow the
lead of these nations, as doing so would lead to fairer, more child-friendly determinations of
country of habitual residence.
A. The Swiss Model
After much frustration over the domestic application of the Hague Convention, in 2007,
the Swiss Parliament enacted a law that ensures representation for children in all Hague
Convention cases.143 Article Nine of this law states: “The court shall order that the child be
represented and designate as a representative a person experienced in welfare and legal matters.
This person may file applications and lodge appeals.”144 Part of the motivation for this article
was that the Parliament had found that judges rarely exercised their authority to appoint
representatives for children in divorce and Hague Convention cases. 145 This rule is admirable in
particular because, by eliminating parents’ and courts’ discretion on the issue of appointing
counsel, the rule has reduced inequities in the protection of children’s interests.146
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B. The South African Example
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa focuses on children’s best interests as
the most important consideration in all matters concerning the nation’s children.147 Moreover,
South Africa has legislation in place requiring that, “a child that is of such an age, maturity and
stage of development as to be able to participate has the right to express his or views and the
right that those views must be given due consideration” in all matters that affect him or her.148
The nation further ensures children’s rights to have a voice in Hague Convention proceedings by
requiring that a child “must have legal representation in all Abduction Convention
applications.”149 In practice, the legal representative functions in a fashion similar to a guardian
ad litem in the cases of young children, while with older children the lawyer can take instructions
directly from the child and act accordingly.150 This system has been particularly positive
because with the addition of advocates for children, South African courts have been able to take
the opinions of young children into account in Hague Convention cases.151 This success serves
as a strong argument that requiring counsel for children in all Hague Convention cases in the
United States would both be feasible and allow children’s voices to be heard.
C. Argument for Requiring Counsel for Children in All Hague Convention Cases
U.S. courts should follow Switzerland’s and South Africa’s lead and require counsel for children
in all Hague Convention cases. 152 The decision a court makes in a Hague Convention case
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regarding whether a child was wrongfully removed from his country of habitual residence is
extremely important in determining whether the child must be returned to another nation.
Consequently, these determinations indelibly impact the lives of hundreds of children
annually.153 Moreover, there is a growing consensus in the U.S. legal community that children
should always have an independent client-directed lawyer in proceedings that affect them. 154
Finally, requiring counsel in all Hague Convention proceedings would allow the model standard
proposed in Figure 1155 to be implemented in the most successful fashion possible.
VII.

Conclusion

When determining country of habitual residence in Hague Convention cases, U.S. courts
should move away from their current jurisprudence and adopt a child-centric approach that
incorporates the opinion of the child, such as the test set forth in Figure 1.156 Moreover, in order
to properly implement this new test, the United States should require the appointment of
independent counsel for the child in every Hague Convention case. Together, these two changes
would bring U.S. law into line with international law, increase predictability in Hague
Convention cases, and create fairer outcomes for children caught in the middle of complicated
custody battles.

(“A Hague case differs from a custody case in that a Hague proceeding does not adjudicate the child's best interests.
Consequently, neither parent will necessarily be focused on the child's best interest, nor will the court. That reality
makes a representative for the child imperative because there is a great chance that the parents' positions will
conflict with the child's interests.”)
153
Id. at 378.
154
See Elrod, supra note 138, at 670 n.36 (citing Annual Meeting of American Bar Assoc., August, 2011) (noting
that, in August, 2011, the American Bar Association voted to adopt the ABA Section of Litigation’s Model Act
Governing the Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings which requires
appointment of a lawyer for children in all abuse and neglect cases).
155
See supra Figure 1.
156
Id.

27

